Disentangling the share buyback puzzle : post-event insider trades by Ahmed, Waqar & Taffler, Richard J.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Working paper (or pre-print) 
The version presented here is a Working Paper (or ‘pre-print’) that may be later published 
elsewhere. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/139764                            
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to the repository item page, detailed above, for the most recent bibliographic 
citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to 
above, will contain details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
1 
 
Disentangling the share buyback puzzle: post-event insider trades 
 
Waqar Ahmed and Richard Taffler* 
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, UK 
 
This Version: June 28, 2020 
Abstract 
Open market share repurchase announcements are generally viewed as a signal of firm 
undervaluation but these can be employed opportunistically. We show that insiders 
strategically time the disclosure of, and their trades around, a repurchase announcement to trade 
more profitably. Insiders significantly reduce their sales before, but sell more heavily in the 
month after, a repurchase announcement. Such a trading pattern is more pronounced in smaller 
firms, and those that are less likely to be undervalued. In addition, we find that insider trades 
following a repurchase announcement not only elucidate insiders’ repurchase motives, but also 
have incremental informativeness; greater equity retention by insiders is associated with higher 
long-run returns as well as actual repurchase completion rates.  
JEL codes: G30, G32, G35 
Key words: Insider trading, repurchase announcements, signaling, market timing 
 
 
 
* Waqar Ahmed, Waqar.Ahmed@wbs.ac.uk (corresponding author); Richard Taffler, 
Richard.Taffler@wbs.ac.uk. Both authors are at Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, CV4 7AL, 
United Kingdom. 
We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Jesse Fried (Harvard), Steve Young (Lancaster), Jana 
Fidrmuc (Warwick), Edward Lee (Manchester), Chendi Zhang (Warwick), Jay Dahya (CUNY, USA), Alok 
Kumar (Miami, USA), and participants at the following conference: European Financial Management Association 
annual meeting 2019, Financial Management Association annual meeting 2017, Financial Management 
Association Europe 2016 and 2018, Paris Financial Management Conference 2016, and also seminar participants 
at Warwick Business School.
1 
 
Disentangling the share buyback puzzle: post-event insider trades 
 
Abstract 
Open market share repurchase announcements are generally viewed as a signal of firm 
undervaluation but these can be employed opportunistically. We show that insiders strategically 
time the disclosure of, and their trades around, a repurchase announcement to trade more 
profitably. Insiders significantly reduce their sales before, but sell more heavily in the month after, 
a repurchase announcement. Such a trading pattern is more pronounced in smaller firms, and those 
that are less likely to be undervalued. In addition, we find that insider trades following a repurchase 
announcement not only elucidate insiders’ repurchase motives, but also have incremental 
informativeness; greater equity retention by insiders is associated with higher long-run returns as 
well as actual repurchase completion rates.  
 
JEL codes: G30, G32, G35 
Key words: Insider trading, repurchase announcements, signaling, market timing 
 
  
2 
 
1 Introduction 
“….buybacks give executives an opportunity to take significant cash off the table, breaking 
the pay-performance link. SEC rules do nothing to discourage executives from using 
buybacks in this way. It’s time for that to change.” 
[Robert J. Jackson Jr., June 11, 2018, Commissioner SEC] 
Open market share repurchase (OMSR) announcements are generally associated with positive 
stock price movements. The corporate finance literature typically views such events as a 
managerial signal of equity undervaluation (e.g., Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981), Comment and 
Jarrell (1991), Persons (1997), and Brav et al. (2005)). This asymmetric-information-based 
“signaling” explanation of repurchase announcements assumes no or minimal agency problems. 
However, investors may not see such an announcement as a credible signal of undervaluation.1 In 
complete contrast to this signaling explanation of OMSR announcements, Fried (2001; 2005) 
claims that managers use these programs in their self-interest, and that the empirical evidence on 
repurchases is more consistent with his “managerial opportunism” theory – managers timing 
repurchase announcement and their trades around it for personal gains.  
We test these competing explanations by exploring insider trading behavior both before 
and after the repurchase announcement event. In an effort to identify undervaluation signaling 
OMSR announcements, Babenko et al. (2012) suggest that investors should react to a repurchase 
announcement signal only if insiders also trade in the direction of their signal in advance of the 
                                                 
1 This is partly because firms are increasingly relying on share repurchases as an alternative to dividends to distribute 
excess cash (see, e.g., Fama and French (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2002), and Skinner (2008)), and partly because 
open market repurchase announcements only represent managerial commitment to repurchase shares but are not a 
binding obligation on their part to complete the announced repurchase (Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Chan et 
al. (2010)). 
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repurchase announcement, i.e., they increase their shareholdings.2 However, this also creates an 
opportunity for insiders to “game” the market around the repurchase announcement. As insiders 
are not barred from trading around the event, they can potentially time the repurchase 
announcement to dispose of their shares at the higher post-announcement price (Fried (2005)).3 
We contend that insiders aiming to game the market by timing their trades around a repurchase 
announcement will sell more shares after, then before, a repurchase announcement event. These 
post-announcement sales will be more profitable for insiders when the stock is less likely to be 
undervalued, and/or when it appreciates sharply on the repurchase announcement. We therefore 
expect post-announcement insider sales to be positively related to repurchase announcement 
returns, and negatively related to the degree of firm undervaluation consistent with opportunistic 
management behavior. 
We next investigate the incremental informativeness of insiders’ equity trades following a 
repurchase announcement. We build on Babenko et al. (2012) and argue that insider trading 
behavior immediately after a repurchase announcement provides an updated and more precise 
signal of insiders’ perception of firm value than pre-announcement insider trades alone, and hence 
these should be correlated with firms’ longer-term returns.4 Firms with higher post-announcement 
insider selling should earn lower long-run returns, consistent with net selling not coinciding with 
undervaluation, and signaling such firms are either overvalued or fairly valued, or at the very least 
                                                 
2 Holding additional firm equity is not only costly but also exposes already under-diversified insiders to considerable 
risk. Buying more equity in their firm will be particularly expensive for insiders when the stock is overpriced. Thus, 
it increases the cost of false signaling for insiders and hence adds credibility to their repurchase announcement as a 
signal of undervaluation. 
3 Section 16 (b) of the Securities and Exchange Act contains a short-swing profit rule that prohibits insiders from 
profitably trading their firm’s shares in the short term, as it requires them to hold any purchased shares for at least 6 
months. However, insiders who already own significant stock in their firm can still profit by trading these and/or other 
acquired shares. 
4 The post-announcement insider trade signal is not only unbiased, as the risk of disclosure (repurchase announcement) 
timing by insiders is eliminated, but also reflects insiders’ updated views of firm value following the market reaction 
to the repurchase announcement signal. 
4 
 
not significantly undervalued. In contrast, greater equity retention by insiders after the repurchase 
announcement signals stock remains undervaluation leading to higher long-run returns. 
Furthermore, we expect greater long-run returns for repurchase-announcing firms when the 
direction of both pre- and post-announcement insider trades consistently suggest stock 
undervaluation.  
Finally, we examine the relationship between post-announcement insider trades and firms’ 
actual repurchase decisions. Firms repurchase their own shares for a variety of reasons apart from 
undervaluation.5 Higher insider equity retention following a repurchase announcement signals 
undervaluation, leading to greater firm repurchases to take advantage of the potential stock 
undervaluation. However, higher firm repurchases when insiders are net sellers points towards 
false signaling by executives (Fried (2005) and Chan et al. (2010)) or firm repurchasing for other 
corporate reasons apart from undervaluation. 
We test these predictions using a sample of 8,945 open market share repurchase 
announcements between 1990 and 2012. Consistent with Fried’s (2001; 2005) arguments, we find 
empirical evidence that insiders sell considerably more shares after the stock price increases on 
repurchase announcement. Net insider sales are nearly four times higher in the month following 
the repurchase announcement as compared to their net sales in the month preceding it. Also, in an 
effort to reduce the litigation risk associated with informed trading, insiders trade more passively 
and significantly reduce their sales before, but sell more heavily after, a repurchase announcement. 
In line with our prediction, our cross-sectional tests reveal that insider selling is most pronounced 
                                                 
5 Other potential reasons for repurchases mentioned in the literature include, for example: i) to distribute excess cash 
(Jensen (1986), Guay and Harford (2000), Jagannathan et al. (2000), Fatemi and Bildik (2012)), ii) as a takeover 
defense (Denis (1990), Brown and Ryngaert (1991) and Billett and Xue (2007)), iii) capital structure adjustments (Lie 
(2002), Dittmar (2000)), iv) to fund employee stock options, and to avoid dilution (Kahle (2002)). We term these 
“other corporate reasons” for repurchases. 
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within firms less likely to be undervalued, i.e., firms with low book-to-market ratios, high pre-
announcement returns, high pre-announcement insider selling, and when the stock price rises 
sharply on the repurchase announcement i.e., high repurchase announcement returns. Although 
higher stock sales can be attributed to insiders’ liquidity or diversification needs, our evidence 
generally seems more consistent with insiders opportunistically timing their trades around the 
repurchase announcement in their self-interest.  
Both our univariate and multivariate analyses highlight that post-announcement insider 
trades have incremental information for investors. We find that firms in which insiders retain more 
equity post-buyback announcement earn 3.7% (4.7%) higher abnormal returns over the next two 
(three) years as compared to firms in which insiders sell down more equity. Consistent with 
insiders purchases being more informative than sales (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee (2001)), we find 
that firms with insider purchase-only transactions earn significantly higher abnormal returns of 
5.2% (9%) in the two (three) year period following the repurchase announcement than firms with 
insider sales-only transactions. In addition we combine pre- and post-announcement insider trades’ 
signals and find when both of these suggest that the stock is undervalued, such firms earn 
significantly higher long-term returns.  
In summary, our insider trading results demonstrate that it is necessary to go beyond pre-
announcement trades alone, and augment analysis with post-announcement insider trades to 
properly assess the underlying motive for a repurchase announcement, and associated firm value 
implications. 
Finally, we investigate the relationship between post-announcement insider trades and 
firms’ actual repurchase decisions. Our analysis suggests that post-announcement insider trades 
are better correlated with firms’ actual repurchases compared with pre-announcement insider 
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trades. Interestingly, we find that insiders trade contrary to their firm, i.e., higher insider sales are 
associated with higher firm repurchases. This appears consistent with false signaling by insiders 
and does not support the stock undervaluation motive for share repurchases. However, when we 
break down our analysis of insider trades by their position/role we find top executives (CEO and 
CFO) and the firm generally trade in the same direction, i.e., their net sales are, negatively related 
to actual firm repurchases. In contrast, net sales by other insiders are positively related to actual 
repurchases by the firm. As top executives have better information on firm value compared to 
other insiders, higher sales by them indicate that the stock is unlikely to be undervalued, and hence 
the firm also repurchases fewer shares. Overall, this novel finding indicates that firms repurchase 
fewer shares when the top executives (CEO and CFO) are net sellers. However, when other 
insiders are net sellers firms repurchase more shares, possibly for other corporate reasons such as 
to fund employee stock option exercises and to avoid dilution (Kahle (2002)).  
This paper contributes to the growing literature addressing the credibility of share 
repurchase program announcements as a signal of equity undervaluation. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that simultaneously examines insider trades before, and after, an 
OMSR announcement. Lee et al. (1992) and Louis et al. (2010) observe insider trades around the 
repurchase tender offer (RTO) and find that insiders increase their purchases before, but sell more 
after, an RTO. However, unlike RTOs that offer a higher premium and are actually completed 
within a month, open market share repurchases are conventionally viewed as a weaker signaling 
tool than RTOs, and are important in their own right.7 This is because open market repurchase 
commitments are non-binding on part of firm management and are spread over multiple years, and 
hence open market repurchases are associated with lower announcement returns (Vermaelen 
                                                 
7 More than 95% of all announced repurchase programs are open market repurchases.  
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(1981) and Comment and Jarrell (1991)). In fact, Fried (2001; 2005) and Chan et al. (2010) suggest 
that OMSR announcements are opportunistically used by managers rather than to convey value-
relevant information to investors. Similarly, Fenn and Liang (2001) and Edmans et al. (2018) 
suggest that managers with more stock options strategically time repurchase announcements to 
artificially increase stock prices before exercising their stock options. Moore (2020) shows an 
increase in share repurchases in the CEO equity vesting months and argues that repurchases are 
used to drive up returns associated with vesting-driven CEO equity sales. We add to this literature 
by directly examining managerial trading behavior both before and after the share repurchase 
announcement, and document empirically that insiders time the announcement, and their trades 
around it opportunistically. Hence not all OMSR announcements can be uniformly viewed as value 
signaling and investors need to take into account insider trading behavior in properly assessing the 
underlying motive of a repurchase program and its firm value implications.  
This paper also adds to the literature on insider trading. Seyhun (1998), Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001), and Agrawal and Nasser (2012), among others, show that insider trades generate 
positive returns and have value-relevant information for investors. Our study provides further 
evidence on this topic. In particular, we highlight insider trading strategy around the repurchase 
announcement and further contribute by demonstrating that post-buyback announcement insider 
trades provide incremental information to investors in evaluating the credibility of the repurchase 
announcement signal, and associated firm returns as well as their actual repurchase decisions. Our 
results, in general, are more consistent with the opportunistic managerial behavior than the 
valuation signaling argument. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background 
to the hypotheses explored in this study. In section 3, we describe our methodology, data and 
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sample selection criteria, and also report summary statistics. In section 4, we present and discuss 
our empirical results. We conclude in section 5.  
2 Background and hypotheses 
The corporate finance literature mainly follows a signaling undervaluation theory argument to 
explain positive share repurchase announcement as well as long-term returns following the 
announcement.8 This theory views the repurchase announcement as a managerial signal of equity 
undervaluation (e.g., Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Grullon and Michaely 
(2004) and Bargeron et al. (2017)). Corporate executives also regard stock undervaluation as the 
primary motive behind the decision to repurchase their own firm’s stock (Brav et al. (2005)). 
However, the financial flexibility and non-binding commitment of open market repurchase 
programs also affords managers the possibility to employ these opportunistically. For example, 
managers may intentionally mislead the market by announcing repurchase programs for their own 
personal gain (Fenn and Liang (2001), and Chan et al. (2010)). 
 To address this credibility puzzle of open market repurchase announcements, Babenko et 
al. (2012) borrow from the insider trading literature, and suggest that investors should respond to 
a stock buyback signal only if insiders trade in the direction of their signal.9 Specifically, they 
argue that by buying more equity in their own firm in advance of a repurchase announcement, 
insiders signal that they view their firm as undervalued, and investors should react more positively 
                                                 
8 Signaling undervaluation is not the only motivation for share repurchases. See footnote 5 for other repurchase 
motives. These repurchase motives are also not mutually exclusive as multiple factors affect the decision to repurchase 
shares.  
9 Insider trades are often viewed as a window into management’s beliefs. For example, Lakonishok and Lee (2001), 
Jenter (2005), Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Agrawal and Nasser (2012), among others, show that insider trades provide 
value-relevant information to market participants regarding their beliefs on firm value and its future prospects. 
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to such repurchase announcements.10 Babenko et al. (2012) find evidence consistent with this 
proposition. Likewise, Cziraki et al. (2017) also show that pre-announcement insider trades are a 
good predictor of repurchase announcement returns.11 
However, because insiders are not legally restricted from trading in their own firm’s shares 
after a share repurchase announcement, they can potentially time the announcement as well as 
their trades around the event to game the market (Fried (2005)). As such, Fried (2005) terms 
buyback announcements a “false signaling device” and claims that the empirical evidence on 
repurchases is more consistent with his managerial opportunism theory – managers using 
repurchase programs in their self-interest rather than as a signal of equity undervaluation. 
Managers in undervalued firms may announce and carry out repurchases to transfer wealth from 
selling shareholders to themselves, and the remaining shareholders. In cases where managers 
intend to sell their equity, they can announce a buyback program to dispose of their shares at a 
higher price. 
A significant body of literature documents that managers engage in opportunistic behavior 
and informed trading.12 Brockman et al. (2008) show that managers manipulate the flow of 
information around share repurchases. Managers increase the frequency and magnitude of bad 
(good) news in the month before (after), share repurchases. They also show that the probability of 
changing the information flow in this way increases with size of managerial ownership stake in 
                                                 
10 Buying additional equity in one’s own firm is a costly and risk-increasing investment for under-diversified insiders, 
especially when the stock is overvalued. 
11 Consistent with this proposition and in line with these studies, we confirm that greater equity retention by insiders 
prior to repurchase announcement is positively associated with repurchase announcement returns in our sample. 
12 For example, Gosnell et al. (1992) find that corporate insiders sell down most of their stake in their firm in the five 
months preceding a bankruptcy announcement. Kim and Varaiya (2003) document that managers sell more heavily in 
quarters in which their firms are repurchasing shares. Yermack (2009) shows that CEOs gift stocks before significant 
declines in their stock prices, thereby allowing them to benefit from increased personal income tax savings.  
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the firm. Edmans et al. (2018) find that managers strategically disclose significantly more positive 
discretionary news in their equity vesting months, thereby allowing them to sell their stock and/or 
exercise options more profitably.13 Such behavior is consistent with management timing share 
repurchase disclosures in their self-interest. Similarly, Moore (2020) documents an increase in 
firm repurchase activity to support or boost share price in months coinciding with CEO vesting-
driven equity sales. 
Our study differs from these studies in that we focus on insiders’ personal incentives to 
time the repurchase announcement and their trades around it to benefit in the short-term. We 
contribute by directly exploring insider trading both before, and after a share repurchase 
announcement. We expect insiders, announcing a repurchase program to game the market, to sell 
more (less) of their stock after (before) the announcement with such a trading pattern more 
pronounced in firms that are either overvalued or fairly valued, or at the very least not significantly 
undervalued, and in those firms where the share price rises sharply on repurchase announcement. 
Therefore, we expect post-announcement insider sales to be negatively related to the degree of 
firm undervaluation, and positively related to repurchase announcement returns. We test these 
propositions formally in hypotheses 1a and 1b: 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Insiders sell more heavily in the month following a repurchase 
announcement event than before it.  
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Post-announcement insider sales are negatively related to firm 
undervaluation, and positively related to repurchase announcement returns. 
                                                 
13 A closer look at the distribution of share repurchase-related corporate news disclosures in their data shows that more 
than half of all share buyback announcements and related updates are made in the month in which managers’ equity 
vests. 
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We further add to literature on insider trading strategies. We dissect and separately analyze 
insider trades by their direction around a repurchase announcement event. The extant literature on 
insider trading suggests that the informativeness of an insider trades signal depends on its 
direction/nature of the transaction. For example, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Agrawal and Nasser 
(2012) argue that insider purchases serve as a more informative signal because purchases are more 
costly. In line with this argument, Seyhun (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) provide evidence 
that the market reacts more strongly to insider purchase decisions as compared to their sales, which 
can be driven by other factors, such as insiders’ liquidity or diversification needs rather than 
changes in their expectations regarding firm’s future cash flows.  
In this paper, we analyze both insider purchase and sale transactions around the repurchase 
announcement event as insiders can use both active and passive trading strategies to achieve 
similar economic effect. For example, insiders can increase ownership stake in their firm either by 
buying additional shares, i.e., trading actively, or by reducing their sales, i.e., trading passively. 
Similarly, following Jenter (2005) we argue that uni-directional trades – where all firm insiders 
trade in the same direction – provide a stronger signal compared to mixed or bi-directional trades 
– where firm insiders engage in both sale and purchase transactions. This is because uni-directional 
trades suggest consensus among firm insiders regarding their firm’s true value, whereas mixed 
trades may represent disagreements.14 
We also investigate whether post-announcement insider trades have incremental 
information and related to long-term returns of repurchasing firms. Prior studies document a 
positive long-term drift in returns of repurchase-announcing firms. However, Louis et al. (2010) 
                                                 
14 In unreported results, we find that the market does react more strongly to insider purchases, and when all insiders 
trade in the same direction (uni-directional trades). 
12 
 
document that nearly half of repurchasing firms in their sample experience negative long-run 
abnormal returns, suggesting that not all repurchasing firms outperform in the long-run. We 
propose that insider trades following a repurchase announcement may serve as a value relevant 
signal and related to firms’ long-term returns.  
In theory, the long-run returns of repurchase-announcing firms should depend on three 
factors: the degree of undervaluation before the repurchase announcement, the initial market 
reaction to the repurchase signal, and finally, the deviation of firm value from its fair value after 
the price adjustment. For example, the stock of an undervalued firm whose market price adjusts 
fully to fair value on a repurchase signal should not subsequently outperform. Similarly, no 
positive abnormal long-run returns should be expected for a fairly valued firm where managers 
announce a stock repurchase to sell their shares at a more favorable price. Post-announcement 
insider trades can therefore reveal insiders’ true and/or updated beliefs regarding firm value and 
hence may help predict long-run returns. Higher insider sales following a stock repurchase 
announcement suggest that the firm is less likely to be undervalued, and therefore such firms 
should underperform those in which insiders retain a greater equity stake in their firm indicating 
undervaluation. Therefore, we expect higher post-announcement insider sales to be either 
unrelated or negatively related to the long-term returns of repurchase-announcing firms. 
Hypothesis 2 thus follows: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The long-term returns of repurchase announcing firms are unrelated or 
negatively related to post-announcement insider sales. 
Finally, we explore the relationship between insider trades and firms’ actual repurchase 
decisions. Open market repurchase announcements represent a non-binding commitment and in 
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fact, Bhattacharya and Jacobsen (2016) note that 27% of repurchase-announcing firms in their 
sample do not repurchase a single share in the first fiscal year following the repurchase 
announcement. Although managers may repurchase for a number of reasons, they cite stock 
undervaluation as the primary motive behind their decision to repurchase shares (Brav et al. 
(2005)). However, Fried (2005) points out that an alternative explanation is false signaling by 
insiders, especially when they aim to time the market around the event. For example, insiders 
trading in opposite direction to their firm after announcing a repurchase, i.e., insiders selling in 
their personal account while repurchasing on behalf of their firm, seems incompatible with 
undervaluation motive for repurchases. Such an observation is more consistent with false signaling 
by insiders and/or firm repurchasing for other reasons apart from undervaluation (e.g., to fund 
employee stock option exercises and to avoid dilution (Kahle (2002))). Thus, observing insider 
trades following a repurchase announcement can provide valuable insights on repurchase 
objectives of a firm. Therefore, a negative (positive) relationship between post-announcement 
insider sales and firms’ actual repurchases is consistent with an undervaluation motive (false 
signaling or other motives) for stock repurchases. This is an empirical question, and we add to this 
stream of literature by highlighting the important role played by post-announcement insider trades 
in determining firms’ actual repurchase decisions and its motives. Hypothesis 3 is thus: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Post-announcement insider trades are related to firms’ actual share 
repurchase decisions. 
3 Methodology, data, and summary statistics 
We collect share repurchase announcement data from the Thomson Financial Security Data 
Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisition database between January 1, 1990, and December 31, 
14 
 
2012. We restrict our repurchase announcement sample to open market share repurchases only. To 
address the duplicate announcement problem, we follow Chen and Wang (2012) and delete 
multiple repurchase announcements made by a firm within a period of two years, keeping only the 
first announcement in such cases.15  
We acquire insider trades data from the Thomson Financials Insider Trading database. 
Insider trades are obtained from Form 4, which is filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) whenever insiders make a stock sale or purchase transaction.16 Similar to Louis 
et al. (2010), we consider trades by all firm insiders in our main analysis instead of focusing only 
on top executives trades as any insider with private information can potentially benefit from it. 
Following Babenko et al. (2012), we only consider open market stock purchases and sales with 
stock accumulated via option exercises and stock grants excluded. In order to focus on 
economically significant trades, we delete all trades involving exchange of fewer than 100 shares. 
Babenko et al. (2012) also provide anecdotal evidence on executive litigation suggesting that 
insiders are more likely to be prosecuted for their sales transactions because insiders with negative 
private information may dispose of their shares before this becomes public knowledge and stock 
price drops.  
Since insiders can exploit both active and passive trading strategies to achieve their desired 
economic outcome, we examine both their purchase and sale transactions around an open market 
share repurchase announcement event. Consistent with prior literature, we calculate the number of 
shares sold (bought) by insiders as the sum of shares sold (bought) by all insiders in a given time 
                                                 
15 Banyi et al. (2008) highlight that an announcement may appear more than once in the SDC data if the same 
announcement appears in different news sources on different dates. 
16 The SEC requires insiders to file this form within two business days of the transaction following the SOX Act. 
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window, and scale it by the total number of outstanding shares.17 If no sales or purchase data are 
available due to a lack of trading activity, we set insider trades (sales and purchases) equal to zero. 
We define net sales as the difference between insider sales and purchases. 
In addition to aggregate insider sales, purchases and net sales, we also derive measures of 
abnormal sales, abnormal purchases and abnormal net sales. We use two methods to calculate 
abnormal trades. First, in line with Kahle (2000), we calculate normal trades as the average 
monthly trades in the prior three-year period commencing 6 months before the repurchase 
announcement. Abnormal trades are then defined as the difference between actual insider trades 
and normal/expected insider trades. It is possible that insiders have equity vesting plans or need 
more cash at certain times of a year, so their trading activity might be more concentrated in these 
periods. Thus, following Agrawal and Nasser (2012), our second measure of abnormal trades 
controls for this time series effect by using the last year’s insider trades for the same period as 
benchmark trading activity. 
 We estimate the market reaction to a repurchase announcement using stock return data 
from the CRSP database. We calculate event firm abnormal return as the difference between the 
3-day (-1,1) buy-and-hold return of repurchase announcing firms, and the buy-and-hold return of 
the market. We use the daily value-weighted CRSP index return as the market return.18 For long-
term abnormal returns, we follow Barber and Lyon (1997) and adopt the buy-and-hold abnormal 
return (BHAR) approach. The authors favor BHAR methodology because it accurately captures 
investor experience. The buy-and-hold abnormal return is the difference between the buy-and-hold 
                                                 
17 Our definition of insiders is similar to one used in the Thomson Financial Insider Trading database. 
18 As an alternative, we use the 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the event date (-1,1), which is defined 
as the sum of the difference between the event firm return on each day and the respective daily return of the market. 
The results are of course qualitatively similar. 
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return of the event firm and that of the market over the two-year period following the repurchase 
announcement, where a year is defined as 252 trading days or 12 months. 
We measure the intended size of a repurchase program as the percentage of stated dollar 
value of the repurchase program to be spent on repurchase activity over the total market value of 
the firm at the beginning of the year. Our measure of stock price run-up is  firms’ 40-day buy-and-
hold return starting four days prior to the repurchase announcement date. For other accounting 
data we rely on the COMPUSTAT database. All variables in the final dataset are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effect of any outliers. 
Table 1 presents frequencies and averages of market value, book-to-market ratio, and size 
of announced repurchase program for our sample firms by year. Our final dataset contains 8,945 
unique OMSR announcements with the highest number of announcements are made in the years 
1998 and 1999. The average size of a repurchase program is slightly higher as compared to earlier 
studies; this is mainly due to the larger size of the repurchase programs after the global financial 
crisis.  
Panel B of table 1 shows the number of repurchase announcements by industry 
classification. Manufacturing industry accounts for nearly 39% of all the repurchase 
announcements in our dataset. Repurchase announcements made by finance and insurance 
companies represent nearly one-quarter of all repurchase announcements. Given their frequency, 
and following earlier studies such as Chan et al. (2004) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), we 
include these firms in our analysis.  
[Insert table 1 here] 
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 Table 2 presents summary statistics of returns, insider trades, and other firm characteristics 
for our sample firms. Panel A of the table presents short-term and long-term returns. The mean 3-
day buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) around the repurchase announcement date (-1,1) is 
2.3%, which is similar to the announcement returns reported in earlier studies such as Ikenberry et 
al. (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) but slightly higher than those reported in later studies 
such as Bonaimé (2012). The mean two-year buy-and-hold abnormal return following a repurchase 
announcement is 10%, which supports the finding of a positive drift in returns of repurchase-
announcing firms documented in earlier studies (see e.g., Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009)). On average, repurchase announcing firms experience a decline in their share 
price before the announcement with a mean stock price run-up of -6.7%. This is consistent with 
the signaling motive for a share repurchase program, where managers initiate the program after a 
significant decline in their stock price.  
Panel B of table 2 provides summary statistics on insider trades for a three-month window 
both before and after a repurchase announcement.19 As expected, insider sales are generally higher 
than purchases. For example, in the three-month trading window before a repurchase 
announcement insiders sell 0.154%, but purchase only 0.054% of their firm’s outstanding equity. 
Net insider sales for the window are thus 0.098%. This difference increases to 0.127% of shares 
outstanding in the three-month period following an announcement, suggesting that insiders sell 
more heavily after the event. However, using either measure of benchmark trades described above, 
abnormal net insider sales are negative in the three-month trading windows surrounding a 
                                                 
19 One-month insider trades before and after a repurchase announcement are not reported in the table, but show a 
similar trading pattern and reported in subsequent analysis. 
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repurchase announcement. This result is consistent with insiders exercising caution and trading 
more passively, potentially to minimize litigation risk. 
Panels C and D provide descriptive statistics of insider trades by insiders’ position in the 
firm. Panel C relates to the CEO and CFO trades only, whereas panel D summarizes trades by all 
firm insiders other than the CEO and CFO. The pattern of insider trades in these panels (C and D), 
in general, is very similar to that of panel B. Firm characteristics are reported in panel E of the 
table. We measure firm size as the log of their total assets; mean and median values are very 
similar. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets of a firm. Cash, cash flow, capital 
expenditures and research and development expenses are calculated as percentages of total firm 
assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market-to-book value, and volatility is the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns in the one-year period before a repurchase announcement. All accounting 
variables are derived from the fiscal year prior to a buyback announcement. Our mean sample 
values are comparable to those reported in Babenko et al. (2012). 
[Insert table 2 here] 
4 Results 
In this section, we formally test our hypotheses using the methodology and data described above 
in section 3. We report the results of both univariate and multivariate analyses. The first subsection 
examines insider trading activity around a repurchase announcement. 
4.1 Pre-announcement trades and short-term returns 
We begin our analysis by confirming the earlier empirical evidence on the association between 
pre-announcement insider trades and the market reaction to a repurchase announcement. In 
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unreported results, in line with Babenko et al. (2012) we find that the initial market reaction to a 
buyback announcement is more positive when insiders retain more equity in their firm prior to 
announcing a repurchase program.20 Consistent with the signaling argument, this suggests that the 
market takes into account pre-announcement insider trades in evaluating the credibility of a 
buyback announcement as a signal of undervaluation.  
In additional analysis, we split insider trades by their direction. Fidrmuc et al. (2015) argue 
that insiders are eager to sell due to their diversification or liquidity needs and hence sell even on 
small mispricing. Insider purchases, on the other hand, require additional investment and are risk 
increasing; thus, insiders are likely to buy only after a significant price drop. Consistent with earlier 
studies, we find that insider sales are less informative compared to purchases and are associated 
with lower abnormal returns. In addition, we test whether uni-directional trades by all firm insiders 
serves as a stronger market signal – highlighting that all insiders hold a unanimous view regarding 
firm value – and is associated with stronger market reaction. We also find evidence consistent with 
this proposition.21  
4.2 Market timing and post-announcement insider trades 
In this section, we test our first hypothesis that managers may time a repurchase announcement to 
sell their personal shareholdings at a higher post-announcement price. Figure 1 provides evidence 
                                                 
20 Average 3-day BHAR is 0.8% higher for subgroup of firms in which three-months net insider sales are below the 
sample mean than for firms in which these are above the mean, and the difference is highly significant. However, the 
mean difference in the long-term returns between the two subgroups is statistically insignificant. These findings 
suggest that pre-announcement insider trades mainly affect the short-term market reaction to a repurchase 
announcement. 
21 In unreported results, we find that the market reacts much more positively to firms with insider purchase-only 
transactions compared to firms with sale-only and mixed transactions. Repurchase-announcing firms with pre-
announcement purchase-only transactions earn a 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal return of 3.3%, which is highly 
significant and 2% higher compared to firms with insider sales-only transactions. Similarly, 3-day BHAR of insider 
purchase-only firms is 0.8% higher compared to firms in which insiders trade in both directions. 
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on this where we plot cumulative net sales by insiders around the repurchase announcement date. 
In line with our expectation, the figure highlights that insiders sell significantly more shares in the 
month following a repurchase announcement. In fact, cumulative net insider sales are nearly four 
times higher in the 30-day period after a repurchase announcement than their net sales in the same 
period before it.  
[Insert figure 1 here] 
Similarly, in panel A of table 3 we compare average pre- and post-announcement insider 
trades. Consistent with our hypothesis (H1a) that insiders can potentially time a repurchase 
announcement to offload their firm shareholdings, we find that insiders sell significantly more 
shares in the month following a repurchase announcement as compared with their sales in the 
month preceding it.22 The mean difference between one-month pre- and post-announcement 
insider sales is 3.47 basis points (0.0347% of outstanding equity) and is highly significant at the 1 
percent level.  
[Insert table 3 here] 
In contrast, insiders also seem to purchase slightly more, on average, post-announcement. 
However, the difference between pre- and post-announcement insider purchases, although 
statistically significant, is only 0.49 basis points.23 The net sales difference between the two 
periods, which is mainly due to differences in insider selling, is -2.93 basis points, which is again 
                                                 
22 We find a similar trading pattern when we compare three-month insider trades before, and after, a repurchase 
announcement. These results are not reported for brevity. 
23 Higher post-announcement insider purchases are not in line with our opportunistic timing of repurchase 
announcement hypothesis, but such purchases can be driven by firm insiders where the market reacts insufficiently to 
the buyback “signal” and stock remains undervalued. It also suggests that insiders trade on their firm valuation. 
Contractual and/or control reasons can also motivate insiders to purchase more shares post-repurchase announcement.  
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highly significant at the 1 percent level. This finding supports our hypothesis H1a and suggests 
that insiders time their trades around the repurchase announcement and sell down more equity 
following a repurchase announcement when stock price, on average, increases for such firms.  
It is interesting to note that both abnormal net sales measures are significantly negative in 
both the pre- and post-announcement periods, highlighting that insiders reduce their trades around 
the repurchase announcement. Even though the aggregate level of net insider sales declines, the 
difference between pre- and post-announcement abnormal net insider sales measures is still 
negative and statistically significant. This suggests that insiders, on average, withhold their sales 
much more before a repurchase announcement and as a result still end up selling relatively more 
shares after the announcement. This result also highlights that insiders adopt a passive trading 
strategy, and sell fewer shares before a repurchase announcement. Such passive trading is 
consistent with insiders being aware of the potential litigation risk associated with their trading 
activity, which they therefore aim to minimize by reducing the volume of their trades.  
The subsequent panels, B and C, of table 3 show the dollar values and frequency of insider 
trades around the repurchase announcement, respectively. Insider trading pattern in these panels 
seems generally consistent with insiders taking advantage of higher post-announcement prices to 
sell more shares by adopting a passive trading strategy. For example, the average dollar value of 
insider sales in the one-month period after a repurchase announcement is $2.75 million compared 
to insider sales worth only $0.35 million in the month before announcement. In panel D, we 
consider trades by top insiders only, i.e., the CEO and CFO. We find a similar trading pattern to 
that reported in panel A. CEOs and CFOs also, on average, sell down more of their shareholdings 
following a repurchase announcement. Like other insiders, they significantly reduce their net sales 
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before, but sell more shares after the market has had a chance to respond to the repurchase 
announcement.  
4.3 Determinants of post-announcement insider sales 
Prima facie, insiders are more likely to sell post-announcement when their firm’s stock is either 
overvalued, or fairly valued, or at least not significantly undervalued. In other words, post-
announcement insider sales will be especially high in firms that are less likely to be undervalued 
in the first place, or when any undervaluation has been eliminated as a result of a strong market 
reaction to the buyback “signal”.24 To test these predictions laid out formally in hypotheses H1a 
and H1b, table 4 compares mean insider trades for subsamples of firms sorted by different proxies 
of firm undervaluation and repurchase announcement returns.  
 Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), among others, approximate degree of firm undervaluation 
using the book-to-market ratio. Following earlier studies, we classify firms with book-to-market 
ratio above (below) the sample mean as value (growth) firms. Panel A of table 4 presents mean 
insider trades for the two subgroups of firms and reports their differences. These univariate results 
clearly show insiders in growth firms sell significantly more, and buy fewer shares in the month 
following a repurchase announcement. A similar pattern is observed when we compare three-
month insider trades around a repurchase announcement. These findings are support hypothesis 
H1b and show that insiders sell significantly more shares after announcing a repurchase program, 
especially in firms which are less likely to be undervalued. In panel B we sort repurchase-
announcing firms into subsamples by their stock price run-up. Firms experiencing a significant 
decline in their share price are more likely to be undervalued. We find a similar trend as in panel 
                                                 
24 Fried (2005) suggests that managers may use repurchase announcements to artificially boost share price so that they 
can sell their equity holdings at a higher price. 
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A, and find that insiders sell substantially more shares in firms which do not experience a 
significant decline in their share price prior to repurchase announcement.  
To further test the robustness of our findings, in panel C we partition our sample data on 
6-month insider trades before a repurchase announcement. Babenko et al. (2012) suggest that these 
pre-announcement insider trades signal their views on firm valuation and hence can serve to proxy 
firm undervaluation. We classify firms as undervalued in which insiders retain greater equity in 
their firm, i.e., with net insider sales below the sample mean. Similar to panels A and B we find 
evidence that insiders sell more heavily post-announcement in firms that are less likely to be 
undervalued.  
In panel D of table 4, we partition our sample data on the basis of repurchase announcement 
returns i.e., 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Firms with 3-day BHAR above (below) the 
sample mean are classified to the high (low) return subgroup. Consistent with Fried’s (2005) 
argument that insiders can potentially time repurchase announcement to cash out at higher stock 
prices, we find that insiders sell more shares when their stock price appreciates sharply on 
repurchase announcement. Overall, the findings in table 4 support our hypothesis H1b. Post-
announcement insider sales are substantially higher in firms that are less likely to be undervalued 
and when the market responds more favorably to the buyback “signal”. 
[Insert table 4 here] 
The analysis above highlights that insider sales following a repurchase announcement 
depend upon both the degree of firm undervaluation and the market response to the share 
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repurchase announcement signal.25 In table 5, we control for the market reaction to the repurchase 
signal and analyze the effect of firm characteristics on post-announcement insider sales. Table 5 
reports mean net insider sales for two-way sorted subsamples of firms. First, each year we rank 
repurchase-announcing firms into two subgroups by their short-term repurchase announcement 
returns. Firms in each subgroup are then split into two subgroups by book-to-market ratio, size, 
and volatility in panels A, B and C, respectively.26 Panel A of table 5 shows that controlling for 
repurchase announcement returns, insiders in growth firms sell significantly more shares post-
announcement as compared to insiders in value firms, providing further evidence on our 
hypothesis H1b. 
To test whether insiders’ private information is more valuable and can lead to greater gains 
in firms that suffer from a higher degree of information asymmetry, we follow Corwin (2003) and 
Zhang (2006) and use firm size proxy for the degree of information asymmetry between insiders 
and investors. These papers, among others, argue that smaller firms suffer from a higher degree of 
information asymmetry because they receive little media coverage and are followed by fewer 
analysts. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) also show that potential profits from insider trading are 
higher in the case of smaller firms than in larger firms as smaller firms are less efficiently priced 
due to higher information asymmetry. These findings lead to the speculation that insiders in 
smaller firms are more likely to trade opportunistically around repurchase announcements and will 
sell down more of their stock holdings after a repurchase announcement compared to insiders in 
larger firms. In panel B of table 5 we find evidence that smaller firm insiders sell significantly 
                                                 
25 For undervalued firms, post-announcement insider sales partly depend upon how quickly and accurately the market 
adjusts to the firm’s fair value in response to the buyback (undervaluation) signal. Any undervaluation is more likely 
to have been eliminated or significantly reduced when the initial market reaction is more positive, and therefore, 
insiders in such firms sell more shares post-announcement, as evidenced in panel D of table 4. 
26 Sorting on these firm characteristics is based on mean values. For example, firms with size above (below) the sample 
mean are classified as large (small) firms. 
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more shares after announcing a repurchase program. This is especially true for firms that 
experience greater price appreciation on repurchase announcement. For such firms, the mean 
difference in one-month (three-month) net insider sales between smaller and larger firms is 1.95 
(4.94) basis points and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
Babenko et al. (2012) argue that it is riskier for undiversified insiders to hold more equity 
in their firm when stock volatility is high. Therefore, insiders in risky firms may sell more of their 
firm stock holdings to diversify risk. However, as shown in panel C, we do not find any significant 
difference in net insider sales between high and low volatility firms. This result suggests that stock 
volatility may not be the most important factor for insiders in their stock sell-down decisions and 
insiders may not be motivated to sell simply for diversification reasons – firm value is a more 
important consideration in determining their stock sell-down decisions. 
[Insert table 5 here] 
In table 6, we test hypothesis H1b using a multivariate approach. We regress net insider 
sales in the one-month period post-buyback announcement on short-term announcement returns, 
pre-announcement insider trades, and their interactions in different model specifications.. 
Consistent with our hypothesis we find that insiders sell more when the market reacts more 
positively to a repurchase announcement, and when the firm is unlikely to be undervalued. For 
example, a one-percentage-point increase in 3-day BHAR is associated with a 0.28% increase in 
net insider sales in the month following a repurchase announcement. Similarly, the positive 
association between pre- and post-announcement net insider sales variables suggests that insiders 
sell more shares after a repurchase announcement when the stock is unlikely to be significantly 
undervalued, as signaled by higher pre-announcement insider sales.  
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In column 2, we regress post-announcement net insider sales on the interaction term 
between repurchase announcement returns and pre-announcement net insider sales. The positive 
coefficient on the interaction term signifies that insiders are further motivated to sell-down more 
of their stock when the firm is unlikely to be undervalued and its price also increases sharply on 
repurchase announcement. Since potential profits are higher for this subset of repurchase 
announcing firms, insiders exploit the opportunity and sell down more of their shareholdings. 
However, the coefficient on the interaction term between repurchase announcement returns and 
pre-announcement purchase-only transactions is negative, although insignificant (column 3). This 
suggests that the market reacts insufficiently to repurchase announcement of an undervalued firm.  
Even though short-term returns for such firms are higher, on average, but the adjustment is 
insufficient. As a result, insiders continue to hold their shares in these firms.  
[Insert table 6 here] 
In column 4, we find a positive and highly significant coefficient on the interaction term 
between repurchase announcement returns and firms with pre-announcement insider sales-only 
transactions. This provides further evidence that even when insiders share a unanimous view that 
their stock is unlikely to be undervalued, they may still time the repurchase announcement to sell 
more profitably, benefitting from increase in price of their stock associated with repurchase 
announcement. This highlights that investors can sometimes misinterpret non-signaling repurchase 
announcements as positive signals thereby allowing insiders to sell-down their equity at higher 
post-announcement prices. In column 5, the negative coefficient on the interaction term between 
repurchase announcement returns and firms with mixed transactions in the pre-announcement 
period suggests that insiders sell fewer shares post-announcement when they disagree on firm 
valuation. The evidence presented above thus highlights that managers can potentially time a 
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repurchase announcement in their self-interest and cash out at higher stock prices instead of using 
this to convey their optimism about a firm’s future performance, as suggested by Fried (2001; 
2005). 
4.4 Post-announcement insider trades and long-term returns 
Next, we explore the relationship between post-announcement insider trades and the long-run 
returns of repurchase-announcing firms, more formally stated in our hypothesis 2. Higher equity 
retention by insiders following a repurchase announcement signals that the firm’s stock remains 
underpriced and should earn higher long-run returns and vice versa. In table 7, we present average 
long-term returns for different subsamples of repurchase-announcing firms ranked by the 
magnitude of insider sales in the month post-announcement. In line with hypothesis 2, we find that 
firms with lower net insider sales post-announcement tend to do better in the long-term. The mean 
two- and three-year BHARs for such firms are 3.7% and 4.7% higher, respectively, compared to 
firms in which insiders sell more of their firm’s stock. We find a similar long-term return pattern 
for the two subgroups when we only consider CEO and CFO trades, except that the effect is 
stronger and lasts only in the first two years following the announcement.  
[Insert table 7 here] 
 In table 8, we investigate the effect of the direction of post-announcement insider trades 
on the long-term returns of repurchase-announcing firms. Consistent with earlier studies, we find 
that insider purchases are more informative, and firms with insider purchase-only transactions earn 
higher long-term returns compared to firms with insider sales-only transactions. For example, the 
mean two- (three-) year buy-and-hold abnormal return for firms in which insiders purchase more 
equity (purchase-only transactions) is 5.2% (9%) higher than firms in which they only sell (sales-
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only transactions) following the repurchase announcement. Although there is no significant 
difference in the mean returns between firms with purchase-only and firms with mixed (both buy 
and sell) transactions, we find that firms with mixed transactions outperform firms with sales-only 
transactions in the long-run, as expected.  
[Insert table 8 here] 
A further contribution of this paper to the insider trading literature is that our data allows 
us to analyze the combined effect of the signals conveyed by both pre- and post-announcement 
insider trades. The post-announcement insider trades signal can either complement or contradict 
the pre-announcement insider trades signal. We expect long-term returns to be higher for 
repurchase-announcing firms when pre-announcement insider trades signal stock undervaluation 
and the post-announcement insider trades confirm this signal, i.e., the stock remains undervalued 
even after taking into account the price adjustment on repurchase announcement.  
To test this expectation, table 9 compares mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns for 
subgroups of firms in which insiders trade in the same direction in the one-month before, and after, 
the repurchase announcement. High (Low) subgroups represent firms with high (low) levels of net 
insider sales in both the pre- and post-announcement periods. As expected, we find that firms earn 
a higher long-term return when both pre- and post-announcement insider trading behavior 
consistently signal firm undervaluation. Specifically, such firms earn an average return of 11.2% 
(17.4%) above the market return in the two (three) year period following the announcement which 
is approximately 7% (10%) higher than the BHAR for firms with greater insider sales.  
[Insert table 9 here] 
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To explore these results in more detail, we conduct multivariate analysis in table 10. 
Specifically, we regress the long-term returns (two-year BHAR) of repurchase-announcing firms 
on the post-announcement insider trades (columns 1 and 2) and the consistency of insider trades 
signal in both pre- and post-announcement periods (columns 3 and 4). In order to remove the effect 
of outliers, we use dummy variables to represent insider trades. For example, our high net sales 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 for firms in the high net insider sales subgroup and 0 
otherwise. The net insider sales subgroups are formed based on three-month (columns 1 and 3) 
and one-month trading windows (columns 2 and 4). 
[Insert table 10 here] 
As table 10 shows, three-month post-announcement insider trades are not significantly 
related to long-term returns. However, insider sales immediately after a repurchase announcement 
are significantly negatively related to long-term returns at the 10% level. Columns 3 and 4 take 
into account insider trades both before and after a repurchase announcement. Here, the dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 when both pre- and post-announcement net insider sales are above 
the sample mean, i.e., insider trades are consistent in suggesting that the stock is less likely to be 
undervalued, and 0 otherwise. A negative and significant coefficient on these variables, 
particularly in the one-month trading window case, suggests that firms with higher net insider sales 
around the repurchase announcement earn lower long-term returns. In fact, such information 
contained in insider trades appears to be incremental to, and not captured by, other proxies of 
undervaluation in our regression models. 
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4.5 Post-announcement insider trades and actual repurchases 
Finally, we explore the value relevance of post-announcement insider trades in explaining the 
actual repurchase behavior of firms that announce an OMSR program. Because such repurchase 
announcements only represent the managerial intention to repurchase shares and are not binding 
obligations, completion rates vary greatly among firms. Managers may repurchase shares on their 
firm’s account either to take advantage of stock undervaluation (Vermaelen (1981) and Ikenberry 
et al. (1995)) or for other corporate objectives. Babenko et al. (2012) show that pre-announcement 
insider purchases increase repurchase completion rates, which is consistent with such purchases 
signaling firm undervaluation. However, it is also necessary to take into account what insider 
trades suggest about firm value after the market has had the opportunity to react to the repurchase 
signal.  
Specifically, we test whether post-announcement insider trades are related to, and can 
explain repurchase program completion rates, as stated in hypothesis 3. Similar in spirit to 
Babenko et al. (2012), we expect higher post-announcement net insider sales to be negatively 
related to repurchase completion rates, which would suggest that the firm is unlikely to be 
undervalued, and hence the firm should repurchase fewer shares as well. Such an evidence on 
lower actual completion rates while insiders are selling is also consistent with false signaling by 
executives. However, managers in such firms may still repurchase shares for reasons other than 
undervaluation and false signaling. Table 11 tests these competing explanations for actual 
repurchase completion rates in different regression model specifications. Following Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) and Babenko et al. (2012) we define actual repurchase completion rate as the 
sum of monthly reductions in the number of shares outstanding (without offsetting them with 
monthly increases) in the 12-month period after a repurchase announcement. Next, we divide this 
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sum by the number of shares outstanding at the time of share buyback announcement. Finally, the 
percentage completion rate is derived as the ratio of actual repurchases to intended repurchase 
program size. We control for other determinants of actual repurchases in our regression 
specifications and include industry and year fixed effects. 
[Insert table 11 here] 
In columns 1 and 3 of table 11, we regress actual repurchase completion rate on net insider 
sales in the one- and three-month periods after a repurchase announcement, respectively. The 
positive and highly significant coefficient on the net insider sales variable in both specifications 
indicates that actual repurchase completion rates are higher for firms in which insiders sell more 
shares. For example, a one-standard-deviation change in three-month net insider sales increases 
the repurchase completion rate by 3.23%. This positive relationship suggests that insiders often 
trade in the opposite direction to their firm, and such evidence, though consistent with the findings 
of Bonaimé and Ryngaert (2013), is puzzling in a signaling context.  
However, upon further analysis, an interesting finding emerges when we split insider trades 
by their role in the firm. Arguably, top executives (the CEO and CFO) have better information and 
can value their firm more accurately compared to other insiders. Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that CEO and CFO trades are more likely to be driven for undervaluation reasons. To test this 
proposition, in columns 2 and 4 of the table we regress repurchase completion rates on the CEO 
and CFO net sales and the net sales by other insiders separately in the one- and three-month trading 
windows, respectively. The coefficient on the CEO and CFO net sales variable is negative and 
highly significant, whereas the coefficient on other insiders’ net sales variable is positive and 
highly significant. These results highlight that when top executives are net sellers after a 
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repurchase announcement, then repurchase completion rates decline for such firms – a result that 
is consistent with both false signaling by insiders as well undervaluation motive for firm 
repurchases, i.e.,  firm repurchasing fewer shares when top executives sell down their equity 
signaling the stock is unlikely to be undervalued.  
In contrast, higher sales by other insiders increase firms’ repurchase completion rates. Top 
executives in such firms may repurchase more on their firms’ behalf for other corporate reasons 
while other insiders are selling down their personal stock holdings in their own firm.27 Finally, in 
columns 5 and 6 of table 11 we include both pre- and post-announcement insider trades in our 
regression model. We observe highly significant coefficients on the post-announcement insider 
trades variables in both models suggesting that post-announcement insider trades are better 
correlated with firms’ actual repurchases as compared with pre-announcement insider trades.  
In summary, our analyses highlight that insiders often trade contrary to their firm following 
the repurchase announcement. The observation is inconsistent with undervaluation motive of share 
repurchases and points towards opportunistic timing of repurchase announcement by insiders. 
Moore (2020) also documents that firm repurchases increase when managers are selling their 
equity. However, our study differs from his work as we focus on the timing of repurchase 
announcement where as he looks at the timing of actual firm repurchases. In addition, incremental 
to Bonaimé and Ryngaert (2013), our findings advocate that to understand the objective of firms’ 
actual repurchases, investors should take into account not only the insiders’ trading behavior 
following the repurchase announcement but also who is trading.  
                                                 
27 It is also possible that managers repurchase more shares in their firms’ account to provide additional price and 
liquidity support while they are selling down their own shares to allow them to trade more profitably.   
33 
 
5 Conclusion 
Open market share repurchase programs lack the characteristics of a credible signal. Babenko et 
al. (2012) assess the credibility of such buyback announcements by analyzing the trading behavior 
of firm insiders prior to the event. However, insiders can also potentially use repurchase 
announcements to game the market around the event for personal gain. Therefore, in this paper, 
we argue that in addition to pre-announcement insider trades, it is important to analyze the trading 
behavior of firm insiders post the repurchase announcement, not just before. Compared with pre-
announcement trades, post-announcement insider trades can provide a cleaner measure of insiders’ 
views on firm value. In particular, the post-announcement insider trades signal is not biased by 
insiders’ timing of the repurchase announcement, and also takes into account changes to insiders’ 
views on firm value following the market reaction to the repurchase announcement signal.  
 In this paper, we find that the market does react more favorably to repurchase 
announcements when insiders retain more equity in the firm prior to the repurchase announcement. 
However, consistent with insiders potentially timing the repurchase announcement, we find that 
insiders, on average, sell more shares after announcing a repurchase program. Insiders sell down 
considerably more when the market reaction to the repurchase announcement is more positive and 
when all insiders appear uniformly to believe that the firm is unlikely to be undervalued. Most 
importantly, our findings indicate that post-announcement insider trades can predict the long-term 
returns of repurchase-announcing firms, an issue not explored in the literature to date to our 
knowledge. We empirically document higher long-term returns for firms in which both pre- and 
post-announcement insider trades consistently suggest that the firm is undervalued.  
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 Finally, we provide evidence that insider trades after a repurchase announcement can 
also better explain the actual repurchase behavior of repurchase-announcing firms compared with 
pre-announcement insider trades. The market can thus benefit by taking into account the 
information content of insider trades around a repurchase announcement when assessing the 
credibility of the repurchase signal to better understand the motive(s) behind open market share 
repurchases which as our evidence suggests can be initiated for opportunistic reasons by firm 
management.  
 In line with managerial opportunism theory of repurchases by Fried (2001; 2005), in 
this study we empirically document that insiders time the disclosure of, and their trades around, a 
repurchase announcement to trade more profitably in their personal account. Our results highlight 
that it is important to take into account post announcement insider trades along with pre-
announcement insider trades to properly assess the underlying motive for a repurchase 
announcement, and associated firm value implications.   
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Figure 1: Cumulative net insider sales relative to repurchase announcement day 
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Table 1: Distribution of repurchase announcements by year and industry 
This table reports the distribution of repurchase announcements by year and industry. Panel A reports 
the distribution by year. Year is the fiscal year in which the repurchase announcement is made. 
Frequency counts the number of open market repurchase programs announced in a given year. Book-
to-market is the ratio of the book value of assets to the market value at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Market value is the average market value of firms in millions of dollars. Intended percentage is the 
percentage of outstanding shares that management intends to repurchase at the time of the 
announcement.  
Panel B reports the distribution of repurchase announcements by industry. Industries are classified 
based on two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in COMPUSTAT. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of repurchase announcements by year. 
Year Frequency 
Book-to-
market 
Market 
value ($m) 
Intended percentage 
1990 433 0.84 898.85 7.32 
1991 114 0.86 1223.93 8.59 
1992 215 0.61 1498.94 7.35 
1993 240 0.59 1651.03 5.85 
1994 446 0.65 1378.79 6.14 
1995 421 0.68 1384.05 6.99 
1996 559 0.58 2264.09 6.46 
1997 488 0.54 1787.50 7.23 
1998 866 0.65 1803.72 8.34 
1999 635 0.73 1819.54 8.02 
2000 372 0.78 3837.12 9.03 
2001 361 0.67 6959.89 8.37 
2002 250 0.74 3917.20 8.77 
2003 253 0.60 4313.64 7.94 
2004 311 0.48 6314.72 8.51 
2005 360 0.47 6983.02 8.02 
2006 354 0.47 9137.10 8.48 
2007 522 0.57 7084.00 9.21 
2008 556 0.74 3543.54 9.90 
2009 182 0.77 5204.74 9.73 
2010 300 0.62 6745.56 10.00 
2011 426 0.62 5842.62 10.08 
2012 281 0.69 8051.59 11.18 
All 8945 0.64 3854.37 8.26 
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Panel B: Distribution of repurchase announcements by industry 
Industry Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
frequency 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 21 0.23 21 0.23 
Construction 100 1.12 121 1.35 
Finance and insurance 2205 24.65 2326 26.00 
Manufacturing 3486 38.97 5812 64.97 
Mining 200 2.24 6012 67.21 
Public administration 28 0.31 6040 67.52 
Retail trade 644 7.2 6684 74.72 
Services 1419 15.86 8103 90.59 
Transportation and communication 537 6 8640 96.59 
Wholesale trade 305 3.41 8945 100.00 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of repurchase announcing firms 
The table reports summary statistics for firms that announced an open market share repurchase program 
during the sample period. The table presents the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation 
(SD) and 1st, 50th and 99th percentiles of different variables. Panel A reports announcement and long-
term post-announcement return statistics (in percentages). 3-day CAR (BHAR) is the 3-day (-1,1) 
cumulative (buy-and-hold) abnormal return around the announcement date (day 0) using the value-
weighted market return as the benchmark. 2-year BHAR is the two year (24 month) buy-and-hold 
abnormal return of repurchase-announcing firms using the CRSP value-weighted market return as the 
benchmark. Stock price run-up is the 40-day (-44, -4) buy-and-hold return of event firms starting 4 days 
prior to the repurchase announcement to -44 days.  
Panel B reports summary statistics on insider trades around the repurchase announcement. (-3-month) 
+3-month sales (purchases) is the number of shares sold (bought) by insiders in the 3-month period 
(before) after the repurchase announcement normalized by the number of shares outstanding and 
multiplied by 10,000. +3-month (-3-month) net sales is the difference between the number of shares 
sold and the number of shares bought by insiders in the 3-month period post- (pre-) announcement 
normalized by the number of outstanding shares and multiplied by 10,000. +3-month (-3-month) 
abnormal net sales is the difference between net insider sales in the 3-month window before (after) the 
announcement and the net insider sales in the same time period last year based on Agrawal and Nasser 
(2012). +3-month (-3-month) abnormal net sales 2 is the difference between net insider sales in the 3-
month window before (after) the repurchase announcement and the normal net insider sales for the firm 
during the same time window (number of months), where the normal net insider sales are measured as 
the average monthly difference in the number of shares sold and the number of shares bought by firms’ 
insiders in the previous three-year period starting six months before the repurchase announcement, 
following a methodology similar to Kahle (2000). All trades are normalized by the number of 
outstanding shares and multiplied by 10,000. -3-month (+3-month) $ purchases (sales) is the dollar 
value of insider purchases (sales) in millions in the 3-month window before (after) the repurchase 
announcement. 
Panels C and D differentiate insider trades by insiders’ position in the firm. Summary statistics on the 
CEO and CFO trades are reported in Panel C, and Panel D presents summary statistics on insider trades 
by all other insiders except the CEO and CFO. Insider trade variables in both panels C and D are defined 
as in panel B. Panel E provides summary statistics on other firm characteristics. Firm size is the log of 
the book value of assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total firm assets. Book-to-market is the 
ratio of the book value of firms’ assets to its market value. Cash is the cash and cash equivalents scaled 
by total assets. Cash flow is operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of assets. 
Capital expenditure (R&D expense) is the capital expenditures (research and development expenditure) 
scaled by the book value of assets. Cash, cash flow, capital expenditure and R&D expense are shown 
as percentages. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market-to-book value of assets. Return volatility is the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns measured over the one-year period prior to the repurchase 
announcement. 
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        Percentiles 
Variables N    Mean     SD 1st 50th 99th 
Panel A: Returns (percentages)           
CAR 8945 2.4 7.9 -23.0 1.8 31.0 
3-day BHAR 8945 2.3 7.7 -22.6 1.6 30.3 
5-day BHAR 8945 2.2 8.8 -25.1 1.6 33.1 
2-year BHAR 8945 10.0 74.8 -124.6 -0.1 338.8 
Stock price run-up 8942 -6.7 17.8 -57.5 -4.9 41.2 
Panel B: Insider trades 
    
-3-month Sales 8945 15.413 54.35 0 0 426.71 
-3-month Purchases 8945 5.369 22.558 0 0 169.36 
-3-month Net Sales 8945 9.787 56.338 -156.83 0 409.12 
-3-month Abnormal Net Sales 8945 -10.462 104.305 -677.34 0 292.21 
-3-month Abnormal Net Sales 2 8945 -8.821 77.636 -383.19 -0.576 265.17 
-3-month $ Purchases (millions) 8945 0.3155 4.78711 0 0 3.8821 
-3-month $ Sales (millions) 8945 4.0627 54.4533 0 0 53.584 
+3-month Sales 8945 18.808 69.422 0 0 562.55 
+3-month Purchases 8945 5.301 22.033 0 0 172.72 
+3-month Net Sales 8945 12.716 65.577 -144.33 0 492.51 
+3-month Abnormal Net Sales 8945 -11.764 124.573 -785.1 0 372.82 
+3-month Abnormal Net Sales 2 8945 -5.892 86.078 -375.48 -0.415 360.56 
+3-month $ Purchases (millions) 8945 0.477 8.12652 0 0 5.0223 
+3-month $ Sales (millions) 8945 4.385 53.4177 0 0 55.165 
Panel C: CEO & CFO trades 
    
-3-month Sales 8945 1.919 8.215 0 0 59.787 
-3-month Purchases 8945 0.479 2.661 0 0 21.614 
-3-month Net Sales 8945 1.399 8.373 -20.482 0 57.121 
-3-month Abnormal Net Sales 2 8945 -0.32 9.019 -34.067 0 41.992 
+3-month Sales 8945 1.849 7.764 0 0 56.761 
+3-month Purchases 8945 0.356 1.886 0 0 15.06 
+3-month Net Sales 8945 1.468 7.779 -13.39 0 55.125 
+3-month Abnormal Net Sales 2 8945 -0.251 8.943 -34.53 0 43.043 
Panel D: Other Insider trades 
    
-3-month Sales 8945 12.294 45.827 0 0 367.02 
-3-month Purchases 8945 4.298 18.909 0 0 146.25 
-3-month Net Sales 8945 7.845 47.286 -130.9 0 348.87 
-3-month Abnormal Net Sales 2 8945 -8.837 70.662 -369.68 -0.462 213.63 
+3-month Sales 8945 15.765 60.902 0 0 489.49 
+3-month Purchases 8945 4.359 18.636 0 0 145.92 
+3-month Net Sales 8945 11.024 59.457 -121.42 0 456.82 
+3-month Abnormal Net Sales 2 8945 -5.659 80.341 -363.83 -0.353 327.36 
Panel E: Firm Characteristics 
      
Firm size 8945 2.783 0.871 0.979 2.742 5.088 
Leverage 8919 0.538 0.258 0.068 0.532 0.973 
Book-to-Market 8900 0.644 0.44 0.058 0.546 2.511 
Cash 8945 16.153 18.339 0.091 8.282 77.274 
Cash flow 8859 12.119 11.055 -25.717 12.05 47.745 
Capital expenditures 8945 4.576 5.438 0 3.017 29.964 
R&D expense 8945 2.646 5.089 0 0 24.361 
Tobin's Q 8900 2.607 2.567 0.398 1.833 17.371 
Return volatility 8942 0.029 0.015 0.009 0.025 0.087 
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Table 3: Insider trades around repurchase announcement 
This table compares pre- with post-repurchase announcement insider trades. 1-month trades refer to 
average insider trades in the month before (Pre), and after (Post), the repurchase announcement. Insider 
trade variables are as defined in table 2 except that insider trade variables are calculated for a month 
instead of 3-month period around the repurchase announcement event. The diff column reports the mean 
difference between pre- and post-announcement insider trades. Significance of the difference in means 
is tested using t-statistics, and the associated p-values are reported in the table.  
    1-Month trades 
Shares traded Pre Post Diff P-value 
Panel A: Insider trades      
Sales  2.93 6.40 -3.47*** 0.00 
Purchases  1.52 2.00 -0.49*** 0.00 
Net sales  1.37 4.33 -2.96*** 0.00 
Abnormal net sales -3.39 -1.92 -1.47*** 0.00 
p-value  0.001 0.001   
Abnormal net sales2 -4.84 -1.88 -2.96*** 0.00 
p-value   0.001 0.001     
Panel B: Dollar value of trades     
Sales value 0.35 2.75 -2.39*** 0.00 
Purchases value 0.03 0.18 -0.15*** 0.00 
Abnormal sales value -0.36 0.20 -0.56 0.29 
p-value  0.00 0.70   
Abnormal purchase value 0.007 0.039 -0.03 0.53 
p-value   0.00 0.44     
Panel C: Trade frequency     
Sale frequency 1.11 2.86 -1.75*** 0.00 
Purchase frequency 0.44 0.83 -0.39*** 0.00 
Abnormal sales freq. -0.51 -0.83 0.32 0.34 
  0.00 0.02   
Abnormal purchase freq. 0.157 0.358 -0.2** 0.02 
    0.00 0.00     
Panel D: CEO and CFO trades     
Sales  0.29 0.59 -0.3*** 0.00 
Purchases  0.13 0.16 -0.03** 0.02 
Net sales  0.15 0.43 -0.28*** 0.00 
Abnormal net sales 
-
0.420 -0.145 -0.28*** 0.00 
p-value   0.001 0.001     
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 4: Post-announcement insider trades of repurchasing firms in subsamples 
This table reports post-announcement one-month and three-month mean insider trades for different subsamples. Panels A, B and C divide our sample firms into 
high and low subgroups based on their book-to-market ratio, stock price run-up and pre-announcement 6-month net sales, respectively. High (low) subgroups 
in panels A, B and C are made up of firms with a book-to-market ratio, stock price run-up and 6-month pre-announcement net sales above (below) the sample 
mean, respectively. Finally, Panel D classifies the sample firms based on their three-day (-1, 1) repurchase announcement return into high and low announcement 
(Ann.) return subgroups. Firms with three-day BHARs above (below) the sample mean are included in High (Low) announcement return subgroup. Insider 
trade variables are as defined in tables 2 and 3 and calculate 1-month trades similarly. The difference in means between subgroups for each panel is reported in 
the Diff column. The significance of difference in mean insider trades between subgroups is tested using the t-test. P-values associated with the t-statistics are 
also reported in the table. 
  Panel A: Book-to-Market ratio   Panel B: Stock price Run-up 
Variables Low High   Diff P-value  High Low   Diff P-value 
1-month Sales 7.43 4.83  2.60*** 0.0001  7.45 5.14  2.31*** 0.0001 
1-month Purchases 1.66 2.52 -0.86*** 0.0001  1.43 2.69 -1.26*** 0.0001 
1-month Net sales 5.69 2.26  3.43*** 0.0001  5.96 2.37  3.59*** 0.0001 
3-month Sales 21.32 15.00  6.32*** 0.0001  20.41 16.89  3.52** 0.017 
3-month Purchases 4.32 6.79 -2.47*** 0.0001  3.89 6.99 -3.1*** 0.0001 
3-month Net sales 15.95 7.81  8.14*** 0.0001  15.66 9.2  6.46*** 0.0001 
  Panel C: Pre-announcement 6m Net Sales   Panel D: Ann. Return (3-day BHAR) 
Variables High Low Diff P-value  High Low   Diff P-value 
1-month Sales 15.61 4.4 11.21*** 0.0001  7.44 5.57 1.87*** 0.0001 
1-month Purchases 1.61 2.09 -0.48** 0.0313  1.97 2.03 -0.06 0.778 
1-month Net sales 13.85 2.27 11.58*** 0.0001  5.43 3.45 1.98*** 0.000 
3-month Sales 43.58 13.45 30.13*** 0.0001  20.82 17.21 3.61** 0.015 
3-month Purchases 4.81 5.41 -0.60 0.3225  5.46 5.17 0.29 0.537 
3-month Net sales 36.98 7.47 29.51*** 0.0001   14.3 11.46 2.84** 0.041 
  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 5: Two-way sorted subsamples of repurchasing firms 
This table reports average 1-month and 3-month post-announcement net insider sales for subsamples sorted on two variables. Vertically, each year sample firms 
are ranked into two subgroups based on repurchase announcement return. Low (high) rank refers to subgroup of firms that have lower (higher) announcement 
returns. Horizontally, within each announcement return subgroup, firms are further sorted into two subgroups based on book-to-market ratio, firm size and 
return volatility in panels A, B and C, respectively. High (low) subgroups include firms with book-to-market ratio above (below) the sample mean. In panel B, 
Small (large) refers to subgroup of firms with firm size below (above) the sample mean. In panel C, the high (low) subgroup contain firms with stock return 
volatility above (below) the sample mean. Insider trade variables are as defined in tables 2, 3 and 4. The Diff column reports mean differences between the 
subgroups. The significance of difference in mean insider trades between subgroups is tested using the t-test. P-values associated with the t-statistics are also 
reported in the table. 
Ann. Return Rank  
  
  Panel A: Book-to-market   
Variable Low High Diff P-value 
Low  
1-month Net sales 4.47 1.65 2.82*** 0.0004 
  3-month Net sales 14.76 6.32 8.44*** 0.0001 
high  
1-month Net sales 7.02 2.79 4.22*** 0.0001 
 3-month Net sales 17.25 9.13 8.11*** 0.0001 
 Ann. Return Rank 
  
  Panel B: Firm size   
Variable Small Large Diff P-value 
Low  
1-month Net sales 3.45 3.38 0.06 0.9332 
  3-month Net sales 14.12 9.39 4.73** 0.0147 
high  
1-month Net sales 6.07 4.12 1.95** 0.0234 
 3-month Net sales 15.95 11.00 4.94** 0.0138 
 Ann. Return Rank 
  
  Panel C: Return volatility   
Variable high low Diff P-value 
Low  
1-month Net sales 3.37 3.43 -0.06 0.9378 
  3-month Net sales 13.13 10.82 2.30 0.2598 
high  
1-month Net sales 5.16 5.30 -0.15 0.8639 
  3-month Net sales 15.29 12.65 2.65 0.1851 
    Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 6: Determinants of post-announcement trades 
This table reports the results of regressions of post-announcement insider sales on repurchase 
announcement returns, pre-announcement insider trades and other control variables. The dependent 
variable in all models is net insider sales in the 1-month window post-announcement. Model 2 includes 
the interaction term between repurchase announcement returns and 3-month net insider sales in the pre-
announcement period. Model 3 includes the interaction term between repurchase announcement returns 
and 3-month purchase-only transactions in the pre-announcement period. Model 4 includes the 
interaction term between repurchase announcement returns and 3-month sale-only transactions in the 
pre-announcement period. Model 5 includes the interaction term between repurchase announcement 
returns and 3-month mix transactions – where insiders engage in both purchase and sale transactions – 
n the pre-announcement period. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Regression models also include year and 
industry fixed effects along with other control variables. Announcement return is the 3-day (1, 1) buy-
and-hold abnormal return around the repurchase announcement date (day 0). The other variables are as 
defined in table 2. 
 
      
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 5.89 5.89 5.74 5.91 6.13  
(0.91) (0.91) (0.88) (0.91) (0.94) 
Announcement return (AR) 28.54*** 27.21*** 31.20*** 17.95*** 38.78***  
(7.57) (7.15) (7.5) (4.09) (7.42) 
net sales -3m 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***  
(16.03) (14.76) (15.78) (15.6) (16.08) 
AR x net sales-3m  0.13**      
(2.46) 
   
AR x pur only -3m   -13.06      
(-1.52) 
  
AR x sale only -3m    37.69***      
(4.68) 
 
AR x mix -3m     -19.90***      
(-2.83) 
Stock price run-up 16.02*** 16.07*** 16.02*** 16.21*** 16.13***  
(9.23) (9.26) (9.23) (9.35) (9.3) 
Book to-market ratio -1.23 -1.21 -1.2 -1.12 -1.21  
(-1.35) (-1.34) (-1.33) (-1.24) (-1.33) 
Size -0.47 -0.49 -0.48 -0.56 -0.5  
(-1.06) (-1.09) (-1.08) (-1.25) (-1.12) 
Intended percentage 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04  
(1.04) (1.06) (1.04) (1.11) (1.07) 
Leverage -2.77 -2.75 -2.74 -2.53 -2.68  
(-1.49) (-1.48) (-1.47) (-1.36) (-1.44) 
Tobin's Q 0.32** 0.32** 0.32** 0.32** 0.32**  
(2.13) (2.14) (2.11) (2.11) (2.14) 
Cash 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**  
(1.96) (2) (1.96) (2.05) (2.01) 
Cash flow 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* 0.06*  
(1.88) (1.85) (1.89) (1.91) (1.89) 
Research & Dev. Expense 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
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(0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.27) (0.33) 
CAPEX -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  
(-0.23) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.17) (-0.21) 
Return volatility -9.34 -8.62 -8.15 -4.19 -8.43  
(-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.16) (-0.32) 
      
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Observations 8786 8786 8786 8786 8786 
        Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 7: Post-announcement trades and long-term returns 
This table reports mean long-term returns for subgroups of repurchase-announcing firms by post-
announcement net insider sales. Firms are ranked based on 1-month net insider sales after the repurchase 
announcement. The difference (Diff) column reports the difference in mean returns between firms in 
high and low subgroups. The t-test is used to test whether the difference in means is statistically different 
from zero. 2 (3)-year BHAR is the two- (three-) year buy-and-hold abnormal return of repurchase-
announcing firms using value weighted market return as the benchmark. The lower panel sorts firms 
into subgroups by considering CEO and CFO trades only. 
Variables 
Post 1-Month net insider sales 
high low   Diff P-value 
2 year BHAR 0.073 0.110 -0.037** 0.024 
3 year BHAR   0.124 0.170 -0.047** 0.034 
CEO and CFO trades     
2 year BHAR 0.044 0.104 -0.06** 0.022 
3 year BHAR 0.114 0.161 -0.047 0.205 
     Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Direction of post-announcement insider trades and long-term returns 
Table 8 reports mean long-term returns for subsamples of firms based on the direction of insider trade 
in the one-month period following the repurchase announcement. P-only, Mix and S-only subsamples 
include firms with insider purchase-only, mix (bi-directional) and sales-only transactions, respectively. 
Firms with no insider trades are included in the mix subgroup. P-S reports the mean difference in returns 
between firms in the purchase-only and sale-only subgroups. P-M reports the mean difference in returns 
between firms in the purchase-only and mix subgroups. M-S reports the mean difference in returns 
between firms in the mix and sale-only subgroups. The t-test is used to test whether the difference in 
means is statistically different from zero.  
 Variables   P-only Mix S-only   P-S P-M M-S 
2 year BHAR  0.116 0.109 0.064  0.052** 0.007 0.045** 
3 year BHAR   0.2 0.165 0.11   0.09** 0.035 0.055** 
     Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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Table 9:  Pre- and post-announcement insider trades and long-term returns 
This table reports mean long-term returns for subgroups of repurchase-announcing firms classified by 
net insider sales around the repurchase announcement. The high (low) subgroup contain firms with high 
(low) net insider sales in the pre-announcement as well as high (low) net insider sales in the post-
announcement period. Firm are ranked into high and low groups based on 1-month net insider sales 
around the repurchase announcement. The difference (Diff) column reports mean differences in returns 
between high and low subgroups. The t-test is used to test whether the difference in means is statistically 
different from zero. P-values associated with the t-statistic are reported in the table. Variables are as 
defined in tables 2 and 7.  
Variables 
1-month net sales around repurchase 
announcement. 
High Low   Diff P-value 
2-year BHAR 0.043 0.112 -0.069** 0.004 
3-year BHAR   0.078 0.174 -0.096** 0.003 
     Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 10: Long-term returns and insider trades 
This table reports the results of regressions of long-term returns of repurchase-announcing firms on 
insider trades around the repurchase announcement. The dependent variable is the two-year buy-and-
hold abnormal return after the repurchase announcement. Column 1 (2) regresses 2-year BHAR on 3 
(1) -month high net insider sales dummy, which is equal to 1 when a firm is in the high net insider sales 
subgroup based on 3 (1) month post-announcement insider trades and 0 otherwise. High net sales 
dummy (pre&post) is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the repurchase announcing firm is in the high 
net insider sales subgroup in both the pre- and post-announcement periods and 0 otherwise. The dummy 
variable in columns 1 and 3 is based on net insider trades in the 3-month period around the repurchase 
announcement, whereas in columns 2 and 4 it is based on the 1-month net insider trades around the 
repurchase announcement. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis after adjusting standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity as suggested by White (1980). Year and industry fixed-effects are included in all 
regression models. Other control variables are as defined in table 2.  
  Post-ann.   Pre and post 
  3m 1m   3m 1m 
Intercept -0.54*** -0.54*** 
 -0.54*** -0.54*** 
 (-3.13) (-3.14) 
 (-3.13) (-3.12) 
high net sales dummy  (3-month) -0.02 
    
 (-1.15) 
    
high net sales dummy (1-month) 
 -0.04*    
 
 (-1.92)    
high net sales dummy (pre&post) 
   -0.02*  
 
   (-1.7)  
high net sales dummy (pre&post) 
    -0.03** 
 
    (-2.41) 
Announcement return 0.16 0.17 
 0.15 0.16 
 (1.48) (1.56) 
 (1.44) (1.5) 
Stock price run-up 0.02 0.03 
 0.02 0.03 
 (0.44) (0.55) 
 (0.43) (0.64) 
Book to-market ratio 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (4.49) (4.47) 
 (4.36) (4.42) 
Size 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (3.78) (3.9) 
 (3.94) (4.04) 
Intended percentage 0.00 0.00 
 0.00 0.00 
 (0.31) (0.33) 
 (0.32) (0.32) 
Leverage 0.27*** 0.26*** 
 0.26*** 0.26*** 
 (5.1) (5.07) 
 (5.01) (4.99) 
Tobin's Q -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (-3.47) (-3.43) 
 (-3.42) (-3.34) 
Cash 0.21*** 0.21*** 
 0.21*** 0.21*** 
 (3.48) (3.5) 
 (3.5) (3.52) 
Cash flow 0.85*** 0.84*** 
 0.85*** 0.01*** 
 (8.93) (8.93) 
 (8.98) (8.97) 
Research & Dev. Expense 1.61*** 1.61*** 
 1.62*** 1.62*** 
 (7.9) (7.91) 
 (7.93) (7.92) 
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CAPEX -0.8*** -0.8*** 
 -0.8*** -0.8*** 
 (-4.61) (-4.63) 
 (-4.62) (-4.63) 
Return volatility 4.69*** 4.67*** 
 4.69*** 4.7*** 
 (6.85) (6.82) 
 (6.84) (6.87) 
Year FE Y Y 
 Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y 
 Y Y 
R-squared 0.0295 0.0298   0.0297 0.030 
     Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 11: Actual repurchases and insider trades 
This table reports the results of regressions of actual firm repurchases on insider trades around the repurchase announcement. The dependent variable is the 
actual repurchase completion rate, defined as the percentage of outstanding shares actually repurchased by the firm in the one year period following the 
repurchase announcement scaled by the intended repurchase program size (in percentage) at the time of repurchase announcement.  Pre- (post-) ann. refers to 
insider trades in the pre- (post-) announcement periods respectively. 3m and 1m refer to 3-month and 1-month trading windows around the repurchase 
announcement respectively. Net sales is the net sales by all firm insiders in a given time window around the repurchase announcement. The CEO and CFO net 
sales indicate net sales by the CEO and CFO only. Other insiders’ net sales measure net sales by all firm insiders except the CEO and CFO. Other variables are 
as defined in table 2 and 4. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis after adjusting standard errors for heteroskedasticity as suggested by White (1980). 
Regression models include industry and year fixed-effects. 
    post-ann.   pre and post ann. 
    1m 3m   3m 
 Intercept 1.05*** 1.05*** 1.05*** 1.06***   1.05*** 1.06*** 
  
(6.64) (6.63) (6.61) (6.69) 
 
(6.61) (6.7) 
P
re
-a
n
n
. 
Net sales      0.62  
 
(0.47) 
CEO&CFO net sales       5.64 
 
(0.62) 
Other Insiders' net sales       0.65 
 
(0.4) 
P
o
st
-a
n
n
. 
Net sales 9***  5.74***   5.64***  
 
(3.32) (5.08) (4.91) 
CEO&CFO net sales  -82.67*** -28.81***  -30.29*** 
 
(-3.54) 
 
(-3.01) 
 
(-3.1) 
Other Insiders' net sales  14***  7.66***   7.56*** 
 
(4.51) (6.09) (5.9) 
 Stock price run-up -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12***  -0.12*** -0.11*** 
  
(-2.78) (-2.59) (-2.86) (-2.66) (-2.84) (-2.63) 
 BHAR 1 year -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08***  -0.08*** -0.08*** 
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(-4.92) (-4.99) (-5.01) (-5.04) 
 
(-5) (-5.01) 
 Return volatility -2.78*** -2.78*** -2.81*** -2.8***  -2.82*** -2.8*** 
  
(-4.45) (-4.45) (-4.51) (-4.48) (-4.51) (-4.49) 
 Cash 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***  0.15*** 0.15*** 
  
(2.67) (2.74) (2.67) (2.74) (2.64) (2.68) 
 Cash Flow 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10  0.08 0.09 
  
(1.1) (1.22) (1) (1.12) (0.96) (1.04) 
 CAPEX -0.54*** -0.55*** -0.53*** -0.55***  -0.53*** -0.55*** 
  
(-3.42) (-3.5) (-3.37) (-3.45) (-3.37) (-3.44) 
 Research & Dev. Expense -0.51*** -0.5*** -0.53*** -0.53***  -0.53*** -0.53*** 
  
(-2.72) (-2.69) (-2.81) (-2.82) (-2.8) (-2.81) 
 Intended percentage -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***  -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  
(-17.75) (-17.77) (-17.85) (-17.77) (-17.85) (-17.78) 
 Leverage -0.08 -0.08* -0.07 -0.08  -0.07 -0.08 
  
(-1.64) (-1.67) (-1.62) (-1.65) (-1.62) (-1.65) 
 Tobin's Q 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**  0.01** 0.01** 
  
(1.99) (2.04) (1.99) (2.03) (1.98) (2.03) 
 Size 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 
  
(1.21) (1.32) (1.28) (1.35) (1.28) (1.32) 
 Book to-market ratio 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***  0.13*** 0.13*** 
  
(5.47) (5.39) (5.54) (5.39) (5.55) (5.42) 
 Year FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
 Industry FE 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  R-squared 0.052 0.054 0.053 0.055   0.053 0.055 
       Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Figure 2: Net insider sales relative to repurchase announcement day 
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Unreported results 
Table I: Pre-announcement net insider sales and returns of repurchasing firms 
The table shows mean short-term and long-term returns of repurchase announcing firms by high and 
low net insider sales in the pre-announcement period. 3-month net sales is the difference between the 
number of firms’ shares sold and the number of firms’ shares bought by insiders in the 3 month period 
before the repurchase announcement. This difference is then normalized by number of outstanding 
shares and multiplied by 10,000. 3-day BHAR is the 3 day (-1,1) buy-and-hold abnormal return around 
the event date (day 0). 3-day CAR is the three day cumulative abnormal return around the event date (-
1,1). 5-day BHAR is the 5 day (-2, 2) buy-and-hold abnormal return around the event date (day 0). 1st 
year BHAR is the 1 year (12 months) buy-and-hold abnormal return post-announcement where value 
weighted return on the market is used as the benchmark. 2nd year BHAR is the post-announcement 
second year (13-24 months) buy-and-hold abnormal return starting after the first anniversary month of 
the repurchase announcement. 2 year BHAR is the 2 year (24 months) buy-and-hold abnormal return 
of repurchase announcing firms starting from the month of the repurchase announcement where the 
benchmark return is the value weighted return on the market. High (low) columns report mean returns 
for firms with pre-announcement net sales above (below) the mean value of net insider sales. The 
difference (Diff) column reports mean return difference between high and low pre-announcement net 
insider sales firms. T-test is used to test the significance of the difference from zero. P-values associated 
with the t-test are reported in the table.  
Variables 
3-Month net sales (pre-ann.) 
High Low Diff P-value 
3-day BHAR 0.016 0.024 -0.008*** 0.0001 
3-day CAR 0.017 0.026 -0.009*** 0.0001 
5-day BHAR 0.013 0.024 -0.011*** 0.0001 
1st year BHAR 0.048 0.039  0.009 0.5386 
2nd year BHAR 0.060 0.069 -0.004 0.5106 
2-year BHAR  0.099 0.100 -0.001 0.9501 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table II: Direction of pre-announcement insider trades and returns of repurchasing 
firms 
The table reports mean returns by subsamples based on direction of insider trades in the three-month 
window before the repurchase announcement. P only sub sample include firms with insider purchase 
only transaction during the period. Mix sub sample reports mean returns for firms with both purchase 
and sale transactions during the period. Firms with no insider trades are also included in this group. S 
only sub sample report mean returns for firms with insider sale only transactions during the period. P-
S reports mean difference in returns between firms with purchase only and sale only transactions. P-M 
reports mean difference in returns between firms with purchase only and mix transactions. M-S reports 
mean difference in returns between firms with mix and sale only transactions. T-test is used to test these 
differences in returns are significantly different from zero.  
    P-only Mix S-only   P-S P-M M-S 
3-day BHAR   0.033 0.025 0.013   0.02*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 
3-day CAR  0.035 0.027 0.015  0.02*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 
5-day BHAR  0.035 0.025 0.010  0.025*** 0.01*** 0.015*** 
1st year BHAR  0.065 0.031 0.042  0.023 0.034** -0.011 
2nd year BHAR  0.077 0.071 0.057  0.020 0.006 0.014 
2 year BHAR   0.133 0.096 0.088   0.045** 0.037* 0.008 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
